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IF I HAD A HAMMER: THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AS ANOTHER TOOL 
TO PROTECT INDIGENOUS RIGHTS TO LAND 
Heather Bowman† 
Abstract:  As developing countries embrace market economies, a primary source of 
investment is in the form of foreign direct investment through action by Multinational 
Enterprises (“Multinationals”) inside a country’s borders.  Activity by a Multinational is 
often regulated only by the host country, which may place minimal restrictions on it for 
fear of losing investment.  This places the country’s people and environment at risk.  
Indigenous peoples affected by poorly planned or managed development have no 
opportunity to change plans before they are enacted, and have little chance to obtain 
reparation for damages suffered.   
A way of addressing this lack of participation in the development process is through 
the National Contact Point (“NCP”) review process created by the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
(“Guidelines”).  NCP review allows an affected group to challenge a specific instance 
where a Multinational violated the Guidelines.  A challenge can be based on future plans, 
as well as actions that occurred in the past.  Raising a specific instance initiates a review 
process that evaluates the particular concerns of the indigenous people who brought the 
challenge.  Although the NCP itself has no enforcement power, bringing a challenge 
under the Guidelines may affect third-party relationships with the Multinational, 
influencing its behavior through peer pressure.  
NCP review provides a powerful tool to otherwise underrepresented indigenous 
peoples in the development context.  The use of NCP review to change mitigation 
procedures at a hydroelectric dam in Laos illustrates the process and its effectiveness.  
The process of NCP review allows for reconsideration of the development of a mine in 
Papua New Guinea that brought environmental destruction and civil war to the 
indigenous people of Bougainville.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Global demand for raw materials and national desire for growth 
creates pressure on developing countries to exploit their natural resources in 
the quest for outside investment.1  This untapped wealth frequently lies in 
areas inhabited by indigenous peoples, who far too often have little or no 
voice in the development process.2  Displacement or environmental changes 
                                           
†
 Juris Doctor expected, 2007, University of Washington School of Law.  The author would like to 
thank Professor Robert Anderson, Jim Bowman, and the editorial and production staff of the Pacific Rim 
Law & Policy Journal for their assistance throughout the writing process.  Any errors or omissions are the 
author’s own.  
1
 See generally GERARD ELFSTROM, MORAL ISSUES AND MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 1 (1991); 
Rhona K.M. Smith, The International Impact of Creative Problem Solving: Resolving the Plight of 
Indigenous Peoples, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 411 (1998). 
2
 Protection of indigenous lands against government interference and protection of indigenous 
peoples against removal from land without full and free consent are considered emerging norms in 
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caused by development projects may prove devastating to the affected 
people.3  Developers often have little incentive to listen to the complaints of 
indigenous peoples.4  
The worst-case scenario for a social and environmental disaster 
includes government complicity and indifference to the lives of its people.  
Government involvement in development can threaten safety and well-being 
when the government partners with a developer as a shareholder.5  Profit 
sharing may lead to government complicity, or even participation in 
atrocities.6  One example of development gone horribly wrong is found in 
the experience of the native people of Bougainville, an island of Papua New 
Guinea (“PNG”).7  
When the mining conglomerate Conzinc Rio Tinto8 found rich copper 
deposits on Bougainville in 1960,9 the Australian government10 formed a 
partnership with Rio Tinto to build the Panguna copper mine.11  The 
government transferred land rights of native villages to Rio Tinto in 
                                                                                                                              
international law.  However, these rights have yet to be fully recognized.  FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF 
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 5.07[3][c][i] (2005). 
3
 See ABDUL AZIZ CHOUDRY, EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES IN CONFRONTING TRANSNATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS vii-viii (2003). 
4
 Smith, supra note 1, at 418. 
5
 See David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk To Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights 
Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 931, 964, 970 (2004). 
6
 Id. at 970. 
7
 See Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Complaint of Plaintiff, Sarei 
v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2000) (No. 2:00-CV-11695), 
http://www.hbsslaw.com/files/Final%20Rio%20Tinto%20Complaint1037668347503.pdf [hereinafter Rio 
Tinto Complaint];  Roderic Alley, Ethnosecession in Papua New Guinea, in ETHNIC CONFLICT AND 
SECESSIONISM IN SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 225, 225-256 (Rajat Ganguly & Ian Macduff eds., 2003);  
Moses Havini, The Struggle for Bougainville: Indigenous Peoples Oust Global Mining Giant, in  
EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES IN CONFRONTING TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 59, 59-88 (Abdul Aziz Choudry 
ed., 2003);  PAT HOWLEY, BREAKING SPEARS & MENDING HEARTS 26-27 (2002);  Moses Havini & Rikha 
Havini, Bougainville—The Long Struggle for Freedom, http://www.eco-action.org/dt/bvstory.html (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2006);  Mineral Resources Forum, Natural Resources and Sustainable Development, 
Bougainville Island—Panguna Copper Mine Conflict, http://www.natural-resources.org/ 
minerals/development/indigp/Bougainville.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2006). 
8
 After a series of mergers and name changes, Conzinc Rio Tinto eventually became part of the Rio 
Tinto Group, and will be referred to as Rio Tinto throughout this Comment.  For a more detailed 
explanation of the merging and name change process, see infra note 187. 
9
 See Mineral Resources Forum, supra note 7.  
10
 Bougainville was a German colony from colonization until World War II.  Between the end of 
World War II and December of 1973, Bougainville and PNG were under Australian authority as United 
Nations Trust Territories.  Self government was granted to PNG in 1973.  In December 1975, PNG gained 
full independence and Bougainville was declared part of PNG territory.  Before PNG gained full 
independence, Bougainville declared its own independence from both Australia and PNG on September 1, 
1975.  This independence was not recognized, but a deal was struck in 1976 allowing Bougainville limited 
autonomy and an independent provincial government.  HOWLEY, supra note 7, at 26-27; Mineral Resources 
Forum, supra note 7. 
11
 See Rio Tinto Complaint, supra note 7, at 1.  
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exchange for a nineteen percent share in the mine’s output.12  The native 
Bougainville islanders soon learned that under Australian law, all property 
under the ground belonged to the State of Australia, contrary to indigenous 
land practices, and that they were to receive minimal compensation for the 
surface land destroyed in construction of the open-pit mine.13  During peak 
production, PNG’s share of the Panguna mine profits amounted to seventeen 
percent of the nation’s total annual revenue.14  
Conflict over the mine began with land seizures and intensified as 
development advanced.15  According to allegations brought by the 
indigenous people,16 Rio Tinto failed to exercise proper environmental 
controls during mine development and operations, causing massive damage 
to the ecosystem of the island and surrounding ocean.17  Rio Tinto 
“chemically defoliated, bulldozed, and sluiced off an entire mountainside” to 
build the mine.18  During operation, “billions of tons of toxic mine waste 
was generated and dumped onto the land and into the pristine waters, filling 
major rivers with tailings, polluting a major bay dozens of miles away, and 
the Pacific Ocean as well.”19  
When native demands for environmental cleanup and local profit 
investment were ignored by Rio Tinto, a newly-formed militant group, the 
Bougainville Revolutionary Army (“BRA”), blew up the electricity pylons 
for the mine.20  This act of rebellion was primarily intended to draw attention 
to the wrongs done to the native people rather than to close the mine, but 
when recognition failed, BRA soldiers began to shoot anyone using the mine 
access road.21  
                                           
12
 Id. 
13
 See HOWLEY, supra note 7, at 25.  Compensation offered by Rio Tinto in at least one location, 
Rorovana, was U.S.$105 per acre and $2 per coconut tree.  These amounts were non-negotiable.  The offer 
was made on July 28, 1969, and had to be accepted by August 1, 1969, or nothing would be paid.  Rio 
Tinto Complaint, supra note 7, at 26.  
14
 See Rio Tinto Complaint, supra note 7, at 37.  By peak production, PNG had gained independence 
and the percentage of annual revenue cited is for the independent nation of PNG.  The mine as a source of 
revenue did, however, influence Australia’s decision to allow and support construction.  Mining revenue 
changed PNG from a colonial burden to a source of revenue.  See HOWLEY, supra note 7, at 26-27. 
15
 HOWLEY, supra note 7, at 25. 
16
 Although the allegations presented in the Bougainville islanders’ complaint have not been proven 
in court, and Rio Tinto did not address them in response briefs, the allegations provide a valuable source of 
the islanders’ continued discontent with the events that occurred on Bougainville.  See Rio Tinto 
Complaint, supra note 7, at 2. 
17
 Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2002).   
18
 See Rio Tinto Complaint, supra note 7, at 3. 
19
 Id. 
20
 The demands were made in 1989.  See HOWLEY, supra note 7, at 36. 
21
 See id. 
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Local riot police responded with violence, and the PNG military was 
called in, allegedly at the demand of and with assistance from Rio Tinto.22 
Military and police violence against ordinary citizens led some to join the 
BRA, while others joined because of environmental degradation that left 
them unable to farm or fish.23  BRA excesses led to the formation of the 
Resistance, a separate paramilitary group who aligned themselves with the 
PNG army.24 
In 1990, PNG soldiers and police withdrew and the two groups of 
freedom fighters on Bougainville, the BRA and the Resistance, turned on 
each other in a bloody civil war.25  The PNG government set up a military 
blockade around the island to coerce the BRA to surrender and bring peace 
so that the mine could be reopened.26  The blockade prevented medicine and 
other essential items from reaching the island, causing the death of at least 
10,000 people between 1990 and 1997, including many women who died in 
childbirth and children who died of preventable diseases.27   
Although a class action lawsuit was filed against Rio Tinto in United 
States Federal District Court,28 this ex post facto attempt to make up for 
some of the losses of the indigenous people is an inadequate response to the 
problems the mine development has created.  No amount of financial 
compensation, even if granted, could fully make up for the losses suffered 
by affected individuals, nor will money restore the island’s environment to 
its former pristine state.29  The allegations raised by the indigenous people of 
Bougainville share company with numerous other claims brought to U.S. 
courts in an attempt to gain at least some redress for suffering.30  
                                           
22
 See Rio Tinto Complaint, supra note 7, at 4. 
23
 See HOWLEY, supra note 7, at 36-37; Rio Tinto Complaint, supra note 7, at 3. 
24
 See HOWLEY, supra note 7. at 44, n.3.   
25
 See id. at 38, 44. 
26
 See Rio Tinto Complaint, supra note 7, at 1. 
27
 See id. at 4; Mineral Resources Forum, supra note 7.  
28
 See Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1193 (C.D. Cal. 2002).  The case was 
dismissed on summary judgment, the court invoking the political question doctrine, and is on appeal in the 
Ninth Circuit as of April 2006.  
29
 Some of the problems raised by taking such claims to foreign courts will be briefly examined infra 
Part II, but a complete discussion of this problem is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
30
 Cases include Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999) (Indonesian 
plaintiff alleged defendants were liable for environmental and human rights abuses and genocide in 
connection with mining activities in Indonesia); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 
2000) (Burmese plaintiffs alleged Unocal was liable or vicariously liable for human rights abuses by the 
Burmese military in conjunction with the construction of a gas pipeline); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 
01-CV-1357 (D.D.C. 2002) (Indonesian plaintiffs allege liability by Exxon for human rights abuses 
committed by Indonesian military in Sumatra).  See generally GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. 
MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER: THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789 (2003) (arguing that expansion 
of the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) beyond its original intended purpose could threaten globalization by 
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A method of resolving disputes before significant problems arise is 
needed to protect indigenous peoples from the negative consequences of 
international development.  This may require resolution attempts even 
before physical work has begun on a development project.  Particularly 
when the national government is involved with such a project, indigenous 
peoples need a means of third-party, disinterested project evaluation before 
the project has proceeded far enough to have caused substantial harm. 
This Comment argues that indigenous peoples should use the “soft 
power”31 created in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (“OECD”) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Revision 
2000, to establish project review that specifically addresses their concerns 
about development projects.  The OECD Guidelines established a system of 
National Contact Point (“NCP”) review, which can provide an effective 
method for indigenous peoples to have their concerns addressed before 
development begins.  This review can prevent at least some of the human 
rights abuses and environmental degradation that may occur either during 
the course of development or when a disenfranchised people retaliate in an 
attempt to regain what they believe was wrongfully taken.  Indigenous 
peoples around the Pacific Rim who are facing development that will strip 
native lands from them should use the tool of NCP review to ensure levels of 
project review that will protect their land and traditions for themselves and 
for future generations.  
This Comment will evaluate NCP review exclusively as a tool for 
indigenous peoples to limit the harms of development.  Indigenous peoples 
require protection from the particular harms caused by development projects 
led by Multinationals,32 as do others in developing countries in the Pacific 
                                                                                                                              
leading to curtailed Multinational investment in developing countries for fear of devastating lawsuits in 
U.S. courts).  Seven of thirty-eight ATS cases have been brought from Asian nations.  
31
 See infra note 75. 
32
 Multinationals are only generally defined in the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises:  
A precise definition of multinational enterprises is not required for the purposes of 
the Guidelines.  These usually comprise companies or other entities established in more 
than one country and so linked that they may co-ordinate their operations in various 
ways.  While one or more of these entities may be able to exercise a significant influence 
over the activities of others, their degree of autonomy within the enterprise may vary 
widely from one multinational enterprise to another.  Ownership may be private, state or 
mixed.  The Guidelines are addressed to all the entities within the multinational enterprise 
(parent companies and/or local entities).  According to the actual distribution of 
responsibilities among them, the different entities are expected to co-operate and to assist 
one another to facilitate observance of the Guidelines. 
THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES pt. 1.I.3 (2000), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf [hereinafter GUIDELINES]. 
The terms multinational corporation and transnational corporation are frequently used interchangeably 
with the term multinational enterprise.  These include the parent company, located in the country of origin, 
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Rim.  Because they are often marginalized and underrepresented in their 
own national governments, indigenous peoples provide a particularly clear 
illustration of groups without protection from development.  It is important 
to note that other potential tools are available to indigenous groups, 
including certain international protections that population groups who are 
simply poor or marginalized do not have.33  In contrast, the NCP review 
process is available to any under-represented group.  This Comment will not 
evaluate the effectiveness of other tools, but will look only at NCP review as 
one tool that can be used, either alone or in concert with international 
protections, to allow indigenous peoples to mitigate impacts of future 
development projects without violence and prior to breaking ground. 
Part II will explain how NCP review provides an ideal method for 
protecting indigenous peoples from poorly planned or mismanaged 
development, both because of its ability to preempt problems with 
development projects and because of its capacity to be invoked by any 
person.  Part III evaluates the effectiveness of NCP review.  An analysis of 
challenges to a hydroelectric dam project in Laos shows how NCP review 
was used to mitigate the effects of development, as indicated by improved 
environmental and relocation mitigation measures and continuing peace in a 
historically rebellious region.  The NCP official recommendations to the 
Laotian dam development illustrate the balance found between the needs of 
indigenous peoples and the awareness of the soft authority of the NCP to 
enforce its own recommendations.  The effectiveness of NCP review as a 
partial solution to the forced silence of indigenous peoples allows for 
reconsideration of the Bougainville disaster in Papua New Guinea.  By 
providing a route for adequate communication and developer response, NCP 
review could have helped avoid the disastrous consequences of the Panguna 
mine. 
                                                                                                                              
and the host country extensions, or foreign subsidiaries.  They may be commercial or industrial, and may 
be state or privately owned.  Although many Multinationals are large firms, they may also be small.  
MICHAEL GHERTMAN & MARGARET ALLEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MULTINATIONALS 2 (1984). 
33
 See COHEN, supra note 2, § 5.07[3][c].  Particularly relevant to the topics addressed in this 
Comment is section 5.07[3][c], Emerging Norms Concerning Land and Territory.  The Inter-American 
Human Rights Committee, the U.N. Human Rights Committee, and the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights have expressly recognized the special relationship indigenous peoples have with their lands.  Id. § 
5.07[3][c][i].  The U.N. Draft Declaration defines “land” broadly, including the right of indigenous peoples 
to “own, develop, control and use lands and territories, including the total environment of the lands, air, 
waters, coastal seas, sea-ice, flora and fauna and other resources” traditionally used.  See also id. at n.642 
(citing U.N. DRAFT DECLARATION, art. 26).  These standards are emerging norms of international law, and 
are soft law without enforcement mechanisms.  See infra Part III.  Their existence does not mean that 
action will be taken according to their precepts.  Although some countries, such as Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, and Nicaragua, have laws that protect native rights to land, most do not.  Id. § 5.07[3][c][ii]. 
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II. NCP REVIEW PROVIDES AN IDEAL METHOD OF PROTECTING 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES BECAUSE IT PREEMPTS PROBLEMS WITH 
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND CAN BE APPLIED GLOBALLY BY ANY 
PERSON 
NCP review, created under the authority of the OECD to provide a 
dispute resolution forum for those affected by Multinational activity, can be 
used by indigenous peoples to create a review of development plans and lead 
to possible mitigation of the development’s effect on them. 
A. The OECD is Structured to Influence the Global Economy 
NCP review exists through the enactment of the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises.34  The OECD itself is made up of thirty member 
nations35 with a shared commitment to democratic government, and has 
relationships with approximately seventy other countries and non-
governmental organizations (“NGOs”), giving the organization a global 
reach.36  The OECD influences the global economy through the production 
of internationally agreed instruments, decisions, and recommendations.37  
The OECD was designed as a forum for the governments of market 
democracies to work together to address the challenges and exploit the 
opportunities of globalization.38  OECD Acts are “soft law,” non-binding 
instruments designed to improve policy through focusing peer pressure on 
non-compliant member nations.39  An important function of the OECD is 
providing the data necessary for governments to be aware of changes and 
developments that affect the global economy, in addition to providing advice 
on how best to deal with those changes.40  The OECD is designed to assist 
governments in fighting poverty and fostering prosperity through “economic 
growth, financial stability, trade and investment technology, innovation, 
entrepreneurship, and development co-operation . . . to ensure that economic 
                                           
34
 See GUIDELINES, supra note 32, pt 1.I.10. 
35
 The member states are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  OECD Home, About, http://www.oecd.org/about/ 
0,2337,en_2649_201185_1_1_1_1_1,00.html [hereinafter OECD Home] (last visited Apr. 14, 2006). 
36
 Id.  
37
 Id.  OECD acts address such varied topics as agriculture, tourism, labor and employment, 
development assistance, nuclear management, international investment and multinational enterprises, and 
energy.  See OECD Decisions, Recommendations and Other Instruments in Force, http://webdomino1.oecd 
.org/horizontal/oecdacts.nsf (last visited Apr. 14, 2006). 
38
 OECD, THE OECD 7 (2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/33/34011915.pdf. 
39
 Id.  On occasion, these agreements may lead to formal agreements or treaties.  Id.  
40
 Id.  
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growth, social development and environmental protection are achieved 
together.”41  
The OECD grew out of the Organization for European Economic 
Cooperation, created in 1947 to coordinate European reconstruction under 
the Marshall Plan.42  Twenty countries ratified the formation of the OECD, 
but it has moved beyond providing direct assistance exclusively to its thirty 
member nations to now supplying information and analysis to more than 
seventy developing economies.43  As globalization has changed the market, 
the OECD has progressed from analyses of policy areas in individual 
countries to an examination of the interaction of various policies on a global 
scale.44 
B. The OECD Guidelines Are Designed to Promote Policies Meant to 
Contribute to Sound Economic Expansion and Multilateral, Non-
Discriminatory Enlargement of World Trade 45  
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are a set of 
voluntary standards for responsible business conduct in a variety of areas, 
including human rights and the environment.46  The Guidelines were 
founded on the notion that international guidelines for Multinationals can 
“help prevent misunderstandings and build an atmosphere of mutual 
confidence and predictability between business, labour, and governments.”47 
Governments adhering to the Guidelines, including the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Australia, France, and Japan,48 are committed to 
promoting them among Multinational Enterprises operating within or from 
their territories.49  
                                           
41
 Id. 
42
 Id. at 9.  
43
 Id.  
44
 Id.  Such analyses include work on sustainable development and consideration of environmental, 
social, and economic issues beyond national borders. 
45
 See CONVENTION ON THE ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
(Dec. 14, 1960), available at http://www.oecd.org/document/7/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1915847_1_1_ 
1_1,00.html; GUIDELINES, supra note 32, at 2-7.  
46
 GUIDELINES, supra note 32, at Part 1.II.2. 
47
 OECD Home, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_2649_34889_2349370_1_1_1_1,00.html [hereinafter OECD 
FAQ] (last visited Apr. 14, 2006). 
48
 Adhering nations include the thirty member nations and nine non-member countries:  Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Estonia, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovenia.  See OECD, GUIDELINES for 
Multinational Enterprises, About, http://www.oecd.org/about/0,2337,en_2649_34889_1_1_1_1_1,00.html 
(last visited June 1, 2006).  
49
 See GUIDELINES, supra note 32, at 5.  
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The Guidelines are one of many business codes of conduct, but the 
only multilaterally endorsed, comprehensive code that governments have 
committed to promoting.50  Adhering countries are home to most of the 
world’s Multinationals51 and supply more than sixty percent of the world’s 
goods and services.52  Thus, the Guidelines express the shared values of 
member governments, and influence the majority of Multinational 
investment.53 
C. The OECD’s Goal of Promoting Sustainable, Stable Global Growth 
Reaches Fruition in NCP Review  
The Guidelines are implemented through a system of National 
Contact Points (“NCPs”), government offices responsible for promoting and 
encouraging observance of the Guidelines.54  Each national NCP helps 
resolve Guideline implementation issues related to specific instances of 
business conduct in its country.55  In addition, each NCP is meant to further 
the effectiveness of the Guidelines by informing prospective investors of 
them and ensuring that the Guidelines are known and available.56  
The existence of an NCP for each adhering country is essential to 
determine how effective the Guidelines are in each country.57  Observance of 
the Guidelines by member countries is voluntary; each adhering country 
invests the Guidelines with importance as it sees fit.58  Each nation 
determines the organization of its NCP, with the expectation that all will 
function in a visible, accessible, transparent, and accountable manner.59  The 
majority of NCPs are single-department entities with consultative structures 
that allow for input from labor, business, and NGOs; other NCPs have been 
established as tripartite or quadripartite entities that incorporate multiple 
government bodies but do not provide for input from non-governmental 
entities.60  
A party affected by a business practice in violation of the Guidelines 
can bring a challenge, known as a specific instance, for review before a NCP 
                                           
50
 OECD FAQ, supra note 47. 
51
 Id. 
52
 The OECD, supra note 38, at 8.   
53
 OECD FAQ, supra note 47.  
54
 See GUIDELINES, supra note 32, pt. 1.I.1-5. 
55
 Id. pt. 2.I. 
56
 Id. pt. 2.III.I.B.2. 
57
 Id. 
58
 OECD FAQ, supra note 47. 
59
 See GUIDELINES, supra note 32, pt. 2.III.I.A.  
60
 See, e.g., The Australian National Contact Point, http://www.ausncp.gov.au/content/what 
.asp?areaid=7 (last visited Apr. 14, 2006). 
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if the Multinational’s home country is an adhering member of the 
Guidelines.61  The NCP of the home country provides review regardless of 
where the specific instance occurred.62  Thus, although a minority of nations 
worldwide is adhering members, the majority of international commerce 
falls within the realm of NCP review.63  Remedies for violations usually 
consist of recommendations made by the NCP, and the majority of 
challenges so far have ended in settlement.64  Another possibility, although 
uncommon, is for the home nation to take legal action based on the 
complaints.65 
D. NCP Review Is Advantageous in the Context of Protecting Indigenous 
Peoples’ Rights 
The NCP review process creates a method for indigenous peoples to 
create an additional level of project review by requiring disinterested third-
party evaluation of a project before construction begins or land is seized, in 
an attempt to ensure that minimum standards for development projects are 
met and to protect the well-being of affected parties.66 
1. Review Prior to Project Construction Contributes to Sustainable 
Global Development 
The loss of land or change in environment in a subsistence-based 
economy can be devastating to the people directly affected, but the failure to 
develop may be equally damaging to the government of a developing 
country attempting to participate in a market-based global economy.67   
                                           
61
 NCP review can also be used by a party to obtain review when the party and the Multinational 
share nationality.  A specific instance was brought to the United States NCP by a U.S. NGO and against a 
U.S. corporation.  See OECD, OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: SPECIFIC INSTANCES 
CONSIDERED BY NATIONAL CONTACT POINTS 11 (June 2005), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/ 
15/43/33914891.pdf.   
62
 GUIDELINES, supra note 32, pt. 2.III.I.C. 
63
 THE OECD, supra note 38, at 6. 
64
 SOMO, Table of Cases Raised by NGOs at National Contact Points (Jan. 2005), 
http://www.corporate-accountability.org/eng/documents/2005/feb_2005_update_on_oecd_cases_raised_by 
_ngos_at_national_contact_points_by_oecd_watch_pdf_38_kb.pdf [hereinafter Table of Cases]. 
65
 For example, UK government officials have responded to allegations against British Petroleum for 
seeking tax and law exemptions and undue influence of foreign governments.  See id. at 4.  
66
 GUIDELINES, supra note 32, pt. 1.I. 
67
 The analysis presented in this Comment takes for granted the development of  market based 
economic development, which itself is a target of criticism.  This Comment does not argue for a new world 
order, but addresses an issue of ongoing concern in the world as it now exists.  For criticism of the 
economic strategies that changed Third World pastoral economies to free market economic regimes, see 
generally MAKERE STEWART-HAREWIRA, THE NEW IMPERIAL ORDER, INDIGENOUS RESPONSES TO 
GLOBALIZATION 146-163 (2005).  
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Development is necessary for these nations, and international investment is a 
crucial source of the required development capital.68  Although some 
funding comes from foreign nations or international organizations, such as 
the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund, much investment is 
provided by Multinationals as foreign direct investment (“FDI”).69  
Multinationals do not generally police their own behavior, and the 
governments of developing countries face difficulties in controlling 
Multinational activity.  Peripheral interests, such as the effect of a 
development project on indigenous peoples or on the physical environment, 
is not the primary concern of Multinationals, which are only legally obliged 
to consider the welfare of their stockholders—individuals rarely directly 
affected by the development projects of held companies.70  Because 
Multinationals provide an important source of development funding for 
developing nations, poor nations eager for investment capital may turn a 
blind eye to actions by Multinationals that cause harm or have the potential 
to cause harm to the host country’s people.71  At times, the nation itself may 
partner with the Multinational to financially benefit from the investment 
opportunity, again at terrible cost to the nation’s people.72  In such a 
situation, the threatened or injured people often have no access to outside 
                                           
68
 See CARLOS M. CORREA & NAGESH KUMAR, PROTECTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT: IMPLICATIONS 
OF A WTO REGIME AND POLICY OPTIONS 141-162 (2003). 
69
 See JOHN H. DUNNING, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 528-29 (1992) 
(“Multinationals are the primary repositories of the capital, technology and organizational capabilities 
necessary to promote the economic welfare of societies”).  Multinational corporations are the primary 
mechanism of foreign direct investment.  See Sidney E. Rolfe, The International Corporation in 
Perspective, in THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 5, 5-6 (Sidney E. Rolfe & 
Walter Damm eds., 1970).  FDI is distinguished from foreign investment, which includes both FDI and 
loans.  See MICHAEL J. TWOMEY, A CENTURY OF FOREIGN DEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD 1 (2000); 
CORREA & KUMAR, supra note 68, at 1-3.  
70
  See Rose Francis, Water Justice in South Africa: Natural Resources Policy at the Intersection of 
Human Rights, Economics, and Political Power, 18 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 149, 158 (2005). 
71
 See Chantal Thomas, Poverty Reduction, Trade, and Rights, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1399, 1417 
(2003) (stating that pressures and opportunities arising from international trade liberalization may cause a 
government to lessen its maintenance of human rights); Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 
1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (allegations of environmental and human rights abuses in a joint venture between a 
developer and the government of Papua New Guinea); Nat’l Coal. Gov’t of Union of Burma v. Unocal, 
Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (allegations of human rights abuses during joint-venture between the 
Burmese government and an American corporation in construction of natural gas pipeline).  This problem 
may be further exacerbated by the information asymmetry between the governments of developing 
countries and the track record of the Multinational in other developing countries with regard to social 
responsibility.  See CORREA & KUMAR, supra note 68, at 148. 
72
 See Thomas, supra note 71, at 1417 (stating that pressures and opportunities arising from 
international trade liberalization may cause a government to lessen its maintenance of human rights); Sarei, 
221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 ; Nat’l Coal. Gov’t of Union of Burma, 176 F.R.D. 329. 
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help.73  Without governmental concern for the well-being of its people, a 
group that finds itself in the path of an important national development 
project has little chance to voice its objections.74 
The Guidelines address these issues by providing a way for parties to 
communicate before irreversible action is taken.  Furthermore, NCP review 
forces developers to respond to the specific concerns raised by the affected 
people.  In a situation where a developer does not provide an opportunity for 
the affected people to express their concerns, NCP review may be the only 
means of communication between opposing sides. 
2. The OECD Guidelines Provide an Ideal Means of Encouraging 
Multinational Responsibility Because They Apply Globally and Their 
Soft Authority Does Not Threaten Multinational Independence 
As soft law, NCP review is particularly appropriate for indigenous 
peoples in developing countries.75  The OECD Guidelines and the NCP 
review process embody some of the greatest advantages of soft law: 
compromise and broad applicability.  Soft law allows non-state actors to 
participate more actively in international relations than is possible under a 
traditional law-making process.76  The Guidelines were established by the 
OECD, an international organization without the power to adopt binding 
instruments;77 a soft law agreement is the only method for the OECD to be 
                                           
73
 See Emeka Duruigbo, Permanent Sovereignty and Peoples' Ownership of Natural Resources in 
International Law, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 33, 59-61 (2006). 
74
 See John C. Dernbach, Sustainable Development as a Framework for National Governance, 49 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 36, 102-103 (1998) (arguing that national sovereignty provides nations alone with 
the ability to truly promote sustainable development). 
75
 NCP review is created under the OECD Guidelines, whose legally non-binding norms are 
distinguished from traditional concepts of law, which have enforceable, precise, legally binding 
obligations.  See Kenneth W. Abbot & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 51, 51 (Charlotte Ku & Paul F. Diehl eds., 
2003); John J. Kirton & Michael J. Trebilcock, Introduction: Hard Choices and Soft Law in Sustainable 
Global Governance, in HARD CHOICES, SOFT LAW: VOLUNTARY STANDARDS IN GLOBAL TRADE, 
ENVIRONMENT, AND SOCIAL GOVERNANCE 8, 8 (John J. Kirton & Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 2004).  The 
Guidelines contain language that encourages or discourages certain behavior but have no power to force or 
prohibit action by a Multinational.  GUIDELINES, supra note 32, pt. 1.I.1.  Soft law, like the Guidelines, has 
been criticized in international affairs for its lack of enforceability because it has no independent judiciary 
or enforcement body.  See Abbot & Snidal, supra at 51.  Hard law relies on state power not only for 
creation and implementation of laws, but also for their enforcement.  See Kirton & Trebilcock, supra at 9.  
Recommendations made by a NCP generally are not enforceable on their own accord.  See GUIDELINES, 
supra note 32, pt. I.1.  Enforcement only occurs when a national government chooses to take independent 
action based on an NCP complaint.  For example UK officials have acted on complaints against British 
Petroleum.  See Table of Cases, supra note 64. 
76
 COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL SYSTEM 13 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000). 
77
 See GUIDELINES, supra note 32, at forward. 
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involved in an international agreement.  Soft agreements facilitate 
compromise, may be drafted and accepted more quickly than hard law,78 and 
allow arrangements between actors who operate under a power imbalance, 
or sovereign states protective of their autonomy.79  The minimal enforcement 
power of the Guidelines, and low threat of the Guidelines to state 
sovereignty allowed for agreement between a large number of countries in 
creating the guidelines.80  Soft law instruments also create methods by which 
such instruments can be applied to multiple, diverse legal systems.81  The 
language of Guideline provisions, while phrased to be not strictly binding, 
can be applied in all adhering and destination countries.82  
NCP review itself can function to facilitate compromise between 
different stakeholders in a development project, and works effectively 
despite any power imbalance between the negotiating parties.83  Through 
their role as stakeholder representatives, NGOs can actively participate in 
international relations.  Perhaps most importantly, the review process 
provides the framework for discussion that can help preempt problems that 
would later require adjudication.  Soft law helps avoid the need for 
adjudication by “providing a framework for negotiation and other non-
adjudicative forms of dispute resolution by creating expectations as to the 
frame of reference for the conduct of negotiations.”84  
The advantages of soft law become obvious when the governments of 
developing countries are faced with a choice between inviting much-needed 
investment into their countries, and protecting the environment and rights of 
marginalized, indigenous peoples.  Using government regulations to protect 
the natural environment and the safety of the people affected by 
development projects may not be a practical or likely solution for a country 
that desires to provide jobs for its people or increase its national revenues.85  
A developing country that establishes high environmental or social standards 
                                           
78
 See Abbot & Snidal, supra note 75, at 52; SHELTON, supra note 75, at 13.  But cf. C.M. Chinkin, 
The Challenge of Soft Law: Development Change in International Law, 38 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 850, 852 
(1989) [hereinafter Chinkin, Soft Law] (arguing that “[d]espite the potential disadvantages of treaties the 
reality is that the process of negotiating a soft law instrument can often be as complex and lengthy as that 
for the negotiation of a treaty”). 
79
 Abbot & Snidal, supra note 75, at 52-53. 
80
 See OECD Home, supra note 35. 
81
 SHELTON, supra note 75, at 12. 
82
 See GUIDELINES, supra note 32, passim. 
83
 See Table of Cases, supra note 64.  
84
 Chinkin, Soft Law, supra note 78, at 862. 
85
 See Sean D. Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next Level, 43 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 389, 395-396 (2005); José E. Alvarez, Kyle Bagwell, Petros C. Mavroidis & 
Robert W. Staiger, It's a Question of Market Access, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 56, 61 (2002). 
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may push some FDI to a country with lower standards.86  Few countries that 
feel they desperately need this money would pass even minimal restrictions 
on investment, for fear that they would turn away investment possibilities.87  
Forcing a Multinational to take specific action to protect human rights or the 
environment is not within the power of most indigenous groups in 
developing countries.88  Limitations that apply to a Multinational regardless 
of location, rather than those that apply only in certain destination countries, 
protect all destination countries equally without punishing those that desire 
protection.  The Guidelines accomplish this by applying to development 
projects regardless of their location, when the Multinational originates in an 
adhering state.89  As such, the Guidelines afford destination countries some 
degree of protection from abuse by Multinationals, without the need to pass 
laws that would, in effect, deter business and investment.   
3. The NCP Review Process Is Ideal for Indigenous Peoples in 
Developing Countries Because Its Neutral Forum Provides a Flexible 
Approach to Parties and Ripeness  
When a national government is implicated in wrongdoing, particularly 
when the State has a weak judicial system, a plaintiff cannot anticipate fair 
treatment from national courts.90  National courts may also be inadequate in 
size or experience for lengthy, complicated trials.91  The courts of a foreign 
nation may be prohibitively expensive, if not legally unavailable.92  
                                           
86
 Alvarez et al., supra note 85, at 61.  
87
 Id. 
88
 See Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human Rights, 20 
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 45, 56-59 (2001).  
89
 GUIDELINES, supra note 32, at Declaration I (“[Adhering governments] jointly recommend to 
multinational enterprises operating in or from their territories the observance of the Guidelines.”). 
90
 One illustration of this is the decision by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
regarding the case of Mary & Carrie Dann.  (Case No. 11.140) (Report No. 113/01, Oct. 15, 2001).  The 
Shoshone sisters petitioned in federal court, claiming the U.S. federal government’s assertion of title over 
tribal lands was racially discriminatory.  After this petition was rejected, the Commission issued a decision 
in 2001 “acknowledging the rights of indigenous peoples in general to their traditional lands and finding 
that the United States had deprived Mary and Carrie Dann of their lands held under aboriginal title through 
unfair procedures.”  Like a NCP, the Commission does not have authority to render a binding decision, but 
its decisions may draw international attention to a nation’s shortcomings.  COHEN, supra note 2, 
§ 5.07[2][e]. 
91
 See ELFSTROM, supra note 1, at 36-38 (examining the government of India’s choice to bring suit 
on behalf of injured plaintiffs in U.S. court). 
92
 In the United States, actions of nations are rarely subject to prosecution because of sovereign 
immunity or the application of the “act of state” doctrine.  Individual plaintiffs cannot sue in the United 
States a corporation involved in a particular project without a sufficient connection between the defendant 
and the United States.  Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign 
state.  Domestic Effect of Foreign Acts or Laws, Act-of-State Doctrine, 48 C.J.S. International Law § 27 
(2006); see also Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (discussing the risk 
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International courts may be closed to individual plaintiffs, and formal 
arbitration may be too costly.93  Furthermore, taking claims to foreign courts 
implicates issues of sovereignty and may be detrimental to world trade.94  
NCP review provides an alternative to proceedings in these courts, and thus 
an increased likelihood that the plaintiff’s claims will be heard in an 
unbiased and capable venue. 
Using courts also presents issues related to ripeness.  Before 
environmental or human rights devastation takes place, plaintiffs do not have 
standing to bring a claim because the issue is not yet ripe for judicial 
decision-making.95  If a population waits until after the negative event has 
occurred, the claim may be ripe, but the damage has been wrought, and no 
amount of restoration, even if available, can fully restore life or land.  
Mitigation measures, if they are carried out, may seem inadequate to the 
displaced people, particularly if representatives of the government or the 
developer do not take the time to listen and respond to their concerns.96 
NCP review sidesteps problems of ripeness because it may occur at 
any point during the development process, including the initial stages of 
project planning,97 while the Multinational is engaged in its work within the 
country,98 or even after the Multinational has withdrawn from the affected 
country.99  This broad timeline for applicability allows claims to be made 
whenever, and even before, problems arise.  
                                                                                                                              
of attracting an action for champerty or maintenance in a PNG court, but holding that contingency fee 
contracts are available for legal fees.)  
93
 See generally JEAN ALLAIN, A CENTURY OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION: THE RULE OF LAW 
AND ITS LIMITS (2000); JAY E. GRENIG, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION §1.1 (2d ed. 1997). 
94
 See HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 30, at 9, 37-43. 
95
 In the United States, at least, the doctrine of ripeness prevents pre-enforcement judicial review 
when those who will eventually feel the impact of the action is not yet felt when conducting daily affairs.  
See 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law §457 (2006). 
96
 For further discussion of this point, see infra Part III.A..  
97
 This is the case in NT2 development.  See Proyecto Gato et administrative law., Complaint Letter 
(Nov. 23, 2004), http://www.proyectogato.be/NCPcomplaint.htm [hereinafter NT2 Complaint]. 
98
 Decisions based on specific instances raised during the course of multinational activity in the host 
country include:  Netherlands National Contact Point, Joint Statement by NNCP, Adidas, and ICN (Dec. 12, 
2002), http://www.oecd.org/document/59/0,2340,en_2649_34889_2489211_1_1_1_1,00.html (follow 
“Joint statement by the Netherlands NCP, Adidas and the India Committee of the Netherlands and 
Background report” hyperlink); Swedish National Contact Point, Statement with Reference to Specific 
Instances Received Concerning Atlas Copco and Sandvik (June 2003), http://www.oecd.org/document/ 
59/0,2340,en_2649_34889_2489211_1_1_1_1,00.html (follow “Statement from the Swedish NCP 
concerning Atlas Copco and Sandvik” hyperlink); United Kingdom National Contact Point, Statement on 
DeBeers (April 24, 2004), http://www.dti.gov.uk/ewt/statements.htm (follow “De Beers” hyperlink). 
99
 The U.N. brought its claim against Avient after the Multinational had ceased all activity in the 
Congo.  See United Kingdom National Contact Point, Statement on Avient (Sept. 8, 2004), 
http://www.dti.gov.uk/ewt/statements.htm (follow “Avient” hyperlink). 
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Although standing to bring a claim is broadly allowed under the 
Guidelines, NGOs commonly bring claims on behalf of various groups.100  A 
petitioning party’s methods of gathering data to support its claim are limited 
only by practical considerations, as illustrated by the costs incurred by the 
Nam Theun II NGO representatives who commissioned private studies to 
support their challenges.101  NGOs may also participate in NCP organized 
events designed to promote the Guidelines in destination countries.102   
Since 2000, thirty-nine NCPs have examined a total of forty-seven 
instances where a petitioner claimed a violation of the Guidelines.103  NGOs 
have brought twenty-two challenges, with several NGOs having brought 
challenges in multiple countries.104  Nineteen cases are currently pending,105 
at least fourteen cases have settled,106 and other cases concluded with the 
NCP’s formal decision.107 
4. The NCP Review Process Is Effective Because It Is a Form of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution that Can Provide Equitable Outcomes 
to Indigenous Peoples 
Alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) provides an alternative both to 
informal protest and to the traditional legal opportunities which may be 
lacking for indigenous peoples.  The NCP review process is a form of ADR 
that is particularly appropriate for indigenous peoples because it allows 
concerns to be addressed while protecting against power imbalance between 
indigenous peoples and Multinationals by limiting the forum and forcing the 
opposing party to come to the table.108  
                                           
100
 See generally OECD Watch, Cases, http://www.oecdwatch.org/406.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 
2006). 
101
 INTERNATIONAL RIVERS NETWORK AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE, Summary: Nam Theun 2 
Technical Reviews (Feb. 2005), http://www.irn.org/programs/mekong/pdf/namtheun/050316annex1.pdf; 
International Rivers Network, Technical Reviews, http://www.irn.org/programs/mekong/namtheun.php?id 
=namtheuntech.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).  
102
 See OECD FAQ, supra note 47.  
103
 OECD Watch, Cases, supra note 100. 
104
 See Table of Cases, supra note 64. 
105
 OECD Watch, Cases, supra note 100.  
106
 See OECD, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Specific Instances Considered by 
National Contact Points 2-11 (June 2005), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/43/33914891.pdf [hereinafter 
Specific Instances]. 
107
 OECD Watch, Cases, supra note 100.  Other cases ended for a variety of reasons, including 
decisions reached in parallel legal proceedings, a finding of no Guidelines violations, withdrawal by the 
submitting party, and inadequate investment nexus to the NCP country.  See also Specific Instances, supra 
note 106, at 2-11.  
108
 See GRENIG, supra note 93, §1.1 (1997).  
SEPTEMBER 2006 OECD GUIDELINES 719 
  
ADR benefits the affected indigenous group because outcomes are not 
reduced exclusively to a win or lose formulation, as they commonly are in 
an adjudicative context.109  As players with little power, inadequate 
resources, and no negotiating leverage, traditional methods of resolving 
disputes are largely unavailable or inadequate for indigenous peoples.110  
NCP review provides a method for resolving disputes that indigenous people 
can access, and that allows for widespread involvement of community 
members.  By allowing more interested voices in the process of creation, 
solutions may benefit all affected parties. 
The NCP review process is particularly appropriate for indigenous 
peoples, compared to some traditional ADR methods.  For instance, 
indigenous peoples are often unable to force negotiation independently, or 
negotiate fairly if the process does begin, due to their lack of power.111  NCP 
substitutes its process for negotiation leverage by providing a forum for 
indigenous peoples to ensure that Multinationals become aware of and 
respond to their concerns.  A common result of such forums has been 
voluntary mitigation on the part of the Multinationals,112 or settlements that 
successfully resolve the alleged violations, before an NCP decision is even 
reached.113  
                                           
109
 Christine Chinkin, Alternative Dispute Resolution under International Law, in REMEDIES IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE INSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA 123, 124 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 1998) [hereinafter 
Chinkin, Alternative Dispute Resolution].  
110
 Unfavorable outcomes could also disrupt any beneficial precedent in countries that have 
acknowledged some indigenous rights.  See Michael Mirande, Sustainable Natural Resource Development, 
Legal Dispute, and Indigenous Peoples: Problem-Solving Across Cultures, 11 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 33, 35-38 
(1997). 
111
 On Bougainville, some negotiation demands by the Panguna Landowners Association and other 
groups were ignored or denied.  The most successful negotiation, in the sense that an agreement was 
signed, occurred to prevent a native group from appealing a case to an Australian appeals court.  The 
landowners claim that only the threat of military and police force led them to enter what they saw as an 
interim and inadequate solution.  Havini, supra note 7, at 73-74; HOWLEY, supra note 7, at 25.  
112
 See Steve Inskeep, Wolfensohn Reflects on the World Bank, audio broadcast on National Public 
Radio, May 10, 2005, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4645837  (follow “Listen” 
hyperlink to download audio) (indicating that challenges to NT2 led to improved mitigation and 
environmental protection) [hereinafter NPR Interview].   
113
 In this context, settlement may indicate a more successful resolution of the alleged violations; a 
number of actual decisions have left the NGOs that brought the claims disappointed or unsatisfied.  See 
Table of Cases, supra note 64.  If during the process of review, the Multinational voluntarily changes 
behavior or plans, then there is no need to monitor or force compliance.  The only publicized instance of 
NCP review having a measurable negative consequence on a Multinational is in the Avient case, a 
challenge to Avient’s alleged contribution to conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by 
providing military equipment.  Avient claimed that banks, organizations, and governments used the 
allegations as reasons why they could not do business with Avient.  The NCP for the United Kingdom 
clarified that the Guidelines are not meant to act as an instrument of sanction or to hold a corporation to 
account, but to be a problem-solving mechanism with view to the parties coming together to an agreement. 
See Statement on Avient, supra note 99. 
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III. THE NCP PROCESS AS APPLIED:  ENABLING SUCCESS IN LAOS AND 
RECONSIDERATION OF THE BOUGAINVILLE DISASTER 
NCP Review under the OECD Guidelines is a potent and promising 
tool to ensure that the process of development does not do irreparable harm 
while it is trying to accomplish good. 
A. Mitigating the Effects of the Nam Theun II Dam in Laos 
The OECD NCP process is clearly illustrated by the challenges 
brought against EDF, the French lead developer of the Nam Theun II 
(“NT2”) hydroelectric dam in Laos, subject to review by the French NCP.  
The dam, when constructed, will disrupt traditional farming and fishing 
activities of 50,000 to 130,000 people,114 open pristine rainforest to logging 
and development, and encroach on the habitat of several endangered 
species.115  NT2 is not the first hydroelectric project in Laos, and at least five 
previously constructed projects have caused devastating changes to the 
affected people and environment, without bringing the promised economic 
benefits.116 
The case for NT2 is strongly supported by its promised financial 
benefits to the nation of Laos.117  Laos is one of the world’s least developed 
countries and is very poor; the majority of the population lives on less than a 
dollar a day.118  Because of its primitive infrastructure, development 
opportunity is limited.119  NT2 promises a poor country with few natural 
resources an opportunity to turn one of its few ample natural resources—
rain—into an exportable commodity—electricity—that can be sold in 
Southeast Asia’s rapidly growing energy market.120  
                                           
114
 See WWF (World Wildlife Fund), Position Statement: Nam Theun 2 Project, Lao PDR (May 9, 
2003), http://assets.panda.org/downloads/namtheun2dampositionpapermay2003.pdf.  
115
 See David J.H. Blake, Review of the Nakai-Nam Theun Social and Environmental Management 
Framework and First Operational Plan (SEMFOP-1) for the Nam Theun 2 Hydropower Project (Jan. 
2005), http://www.irn.org/programs/mekong/pdf/namtheun/NT2FishImpacts.05.02.09.pdf [hereinafter 
SEMFOP-1]; Divisive Dam Likely to Go Ahead, NATION, Feb. 8, 2004. 
116
 For a case study of the consequences of five previous hydroelectric projects, see INTERNATIONAL 
RIVERS NETWORK, The Legacy of Hydro in Laos, http://www.irn.org/programs/mekong/ (follow “Legacy 
of Hydro in Laos” hyperlink) (arguing that affected people are worse off after dam construction and raising 
questions of whether the Lao government has the capacity and political will in future hydroelectric projects 
to ensure adequate monitoring, full and fair distribution of compensation, and environmental protection).  
117
 See Nam Theun 2 Power, How Will the Project Benefit the Lao Macro Economy?, 
http://www.namtheun2.com/faq/faq_lao.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).  
118
 U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK: LAOS (Jan. 10, 2006), 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/la.html. 
119
 Id.; WWF, supra note 114; NPR Interview, supra note 112.  
120
 See Yuthana Praiwan, Nam Theun 2 to Help Cut Power Bills, BANGKOK POST, Feb. 7, 2006.  
Ninety-five percent of the power generated at NT2 will be sold to Thailand.  Id. 
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The project funding structure for NT2 provides an enticing form of 
international investment.  NT2 is a Build-Own-Operate-Transfer121 
Project.122 Anticipated direct revenue for Laos through dividends, taxes, and 
royalties is approximately U.S.$1.9 billion over the concession period of 
twenty-five years, or U.S.$75 million per year—representing 4.4 percent of 
the country’s GNP and thirty percent of the annual national budget.123  At the 
end of the direct revenue period, ownership of NT2 will be transferred to the 
government of Laos at no cost, although the project is designed to function 
beyond this time.124  
Building NT2 will undoubtedly have consequences on both local 
people and the environment.125  NCP review provided a way for the affected 
people to try to ensure that the consequences will be adequately mitigated.126 
Specific concerns raised by the NGOs under seven provisions of the 
Guidelines challenged inadequate mitigation for the impact on displaced 
villagers and plant and animal species.127  
Individual challenges focused on the human rights of displaced 
people.128  More than one thousand subsistence farming families—a total 
population of over six thousand—will be displaced by the reservoir 
formation,129 and the traditional farming and fishing of 50,000 to 130,000 
people will be disturbed.130  Displaced farmers will lose their houses and the 
land their families have used for rotational farming for hundreds of years, 
                                           
121
 As a Build-Own-Operate-Transfer enterprise, EDF will construct and operate NT2 and maintain 
ownership of the dam for the direct revenue period of 25 years. See Letter from EDF to French National 
Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Dec. 8, 2004) (translation by EDF of 
French original), http://www.reports-and-materials.org/EDF-letter-NCP-OECD-8-Dec-2004-English-
translation.doc [hereinafter EDF Letter].   
122
 The Nam Theun II Power Company (NTPC) was founded in 2002 as a concession agreement with 
the Lao government.  The principal shareholder in the development, future head contractor for construction, 
and service provider to the operator NTPC is Électricité de France (EDF), a network of associated 
companies headquartered in France.  The project consists of development, construction, and operation of a 
trans-basin diversion hydropower project using water from the Nam Theun River, a Mekong River 
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confluence with the Mekong River.  See NT2 Complaint, supra note 97.  
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 See EDF Letter, supra note 121.   
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 See id. 
125
 See WORLD BANK, Nam Theun 2 Power Project, http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/ 
main?pagePK=64312881&piPK=64302848&theSitePK=40941&Projectid=P076445 (last visited Apr. 14, 
2006). 
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 GUIDELINES, supra note 32, pt. 3.36.  
127
 See NT2 Complaint, supra note 97. 
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 GUIDELINES, supra note 32, pt. 1.II.2 (“Respect the human rights of those affected by their 
activities consistent with the host government’s international obligations and commitments.”). 
129
 Response to Letter from EDF to the National Contact Point of France 4 (Feb. 25, 2005), 
http://www.amisdelaterre.org/IMG/pdf/response_edf_ncp_feb_05_final.pdf [hereinafter NCP Response 
Letter]. 
130
 See WWF, supra note 114. 
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including their rice paddies and land for buffalo grazing.131  Forests used for 
gathering non-timber products will be logged and flooded.132  The concerned 
NGOs claim the Mitigation Compensation Program calls for replacement by 
one of four possible livelihood options per family: (1) 0.66 hectares of 
irrigated agricultural land; (2) grazing lands for livestock and provision of at 
least two large animals per family; (3) reservoir fisheries; or (4) commercial 
forestry from land along the reservoir.133  The plan also encourages the 
creation of service or business enterprises, including tailoring, machine 
repair, and tourism,134 although support for these services is not planned.135 
Challengers allege that the mitigation provisions listed in the 
Mitigation and Compensation Program are overly ambitious, inadequate,  
not based on an evaluation of the impacted region,136 and in violation of 
OECD Guidelines Chapter V, “Environment.”137  
The NGO International Rivers Network (“IRN”)138 commissioned its 
own studies of the resettlement options.139  Based on the IRN studies, the 
NGO complaint lists several actions necessary for the developer to reach 
compliance with the Guidelines.140  These focus primarily on the inadequacy 
of information supporting the mitigation plans and call for cumulative 
economic analysis of the proposals, evidence that experience with other 
                                           
131
 See NCP Response Letter, supra note 129, at 4. 
132
 Id. 
133
 Id. 
134
 Id. 
135
 Id. 
136
 See NT2 Complaint, supra note 97. 
137
 GUIDELINES, supra note 32, pts. 1.V.1 (“Establish and maintain a system of environmental 
management appropriate to the enterprise, including: (a) Collection and evaluation of adequate and timely 
information regarding the environmental, health, and safety impacts of their activities.  (b) Establishment of 
measurable objectives and, where appropriate, targets for improved environmental performance, including 
periodically reviewing the continuing relevance of these objectives.”); id. pt. 1.V.3 (“Assess, and address in 
decision-making, the foreseeable environmental, health, and safety-related impacts associated with the 
processes, goods and services of the enterprise over their full life cycle.  Where these proposed activities 
may have significant environmental, health, or safety impacts, and where they are subject to a decision of a 
competent authority, prepare an appropriate environmental impact assessment.”)   
138
 IRN, an NGO based in the United States is one of seven NGOs from around the world which 
worked in cooperation to bring the complaint against EDF.  The other NGOs are Proyecto Gato (Belgium), 
Amis de la Terre (France), Mekong Watch (Japan), World Rainforest Movement (Uruguay), Finnish 
Asiatic Society (Finland), and CRBM (Italy).  See NT2 Complaint, supra note 97.  
139
 See David J.H. Blake, A Review of the Nam Theun 2 Environmental Assessment and Management 
Plan (EAMP) as It Pertains to Impacts on Xe Bang Fai Fisheries (Jan. 2005), http://www.irn.org/ 
programs/mekong/pdf/namtheun/NT2FishImpacts.05.02.09.pdf; David J.H. Blake, A Review of the 
Adequacy of Compensation Measures for Communities Living Along the Xe Bang Fai River Nam Theun 2 
Hydropower Project, Lao PDR (Jan. 2005), http://www.irn.org/programs/mekong/pdf/namtheun/ 
NT2Compensation.05.02.09.pdf; see also SEMFOP-1, supra note 115.  
140
 See NCP Response Letter, supra note 129, at 2-3. 
SEPTEMBER 2006 OECD GUIDELINES 723 
  
dams in the region is informing plans for NT2, and a further analysis of 
aquaculture and livestock options.141 
After reviewing the challenges to EDF’s proposed actions and EDF’s 
reply in support of its plan, the French NCP held that no breach of the 
Guidelines could be attributed to the company.142  In fact, the French NCP 
found that EDF had gone beyond Guideline requirements to sign an 
agreement committing itself to social responsibility.143  The NCP did make 
two official recommendations, however, because of the NCP’s responsibility 
“to watch over the effective implementation of the company’s commitments 
to comply with international environmental and social standards.”144 
The first recommendation is that EDF must remain involved in 
implementing all the compensatory measures, as agreed to with the Lao 
government.145  The NCP encourages EDF, along with the Lao developer, to 
pursue appropriate protection measures regarding the potential effects of its 
activities on the environment.146 
The second recommendation specifically addresses the interaction 
between Multinationals and “countries where the legal and regulatory 
system with regard to environmental and social matters is said to be 
weak.”147  The NCP suggests that EDF should “do their utmost to implement 
the internationally-acknowledged best practices that they follow in their own 
country on the construction site and for the people affected by their activity,” 
and proposes that the fundamental standards of the International Labor 
Organization148 are “appropriate rules of conduct for the companies within 
the scope of their activities.”149 
Finally, while not an official recommendation, the NCP proposes 
consultations on at least an annual basis regarding follow-up of project 
                                           
141
 Id. 
142
 See FRENCH NATIONAL CONTACT POINT, Recommendations of the French National Contact Point 
(PCN) Intended for EDF and Its Partners with Regard to the Implementation of the "Nam Theun 2" Project 
in Laos (Apr. 1, 2005), http://www.reports-and-materials.org/French-NCP-Nam-Theun-2-
recommendations-1-April-2005.doc [hereinafter Recommendations].  An unofficial translation of the 
French original by EDF is available at http://www.minefi.gouv.fr/TRESOR/pcn/compcn010405.htm.   
143
 See id. 
144
 See id. (emphasis in original). 
145
 Id. 
146
 Id. 
147
 Id. 
148
 Eight ILO Conventions on four subjects have been identified by the ILO governing body as 
fundamental to the rights of human beings at work, regardless of the level of development of the country.   
These subjects are:  freedom of association, the abolition of forced labor, equality, and the elimination of 
child labor.  See International Labour Organization, Fundamental ILO Conventions, http://www.ilo.org/ 
public/english/standards/norm/whatare/fundam (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).  
149
 See Recommendations, supra note 142. 
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development, its impacts, and the remedial measures taken, in order to 
maintain a high level of best practices.150 
NCP review can bring specific challenges to the attention of the World 
Bank and other prospective investors in order to create an additional level of 
evaluation in areas of particular concern to the indigenous people.151  
Although the level of care desired by the indigenous people may be higher 
than the World Bank’s minimum development floor, this additional review 
ensures at least that minimum.152 
Unable to independently fund NT2 development, EDF was reliant 
upon World Bank investment for the project, and hoped to reach agreement 
in early 2005.153  The NGO complaint brought particular issues to the 
consideration of the World Bank.154  If the proposed safeguards and 
mitigations had not met the World Bank’s minimum standards, it would not 
have agreed to invest in May 2005.155   
Protest, including challenges raised through the NCP review process, 
caused major changes to the mitigation efforts and environmental controls 
used in constructing NT2.156  Although the protest did not prevent the dam’s 
construction, it did change mitigation and compensation plans in a way 
intended to benefit the people and the environment.157  Further evidence of 
                                           
150
 Id. 
151
 As of March 2006, the NT2 project in Laos is the only resolved NCP challenge that relates to pre-
development review based on the direct effects on indigenous peoples.  For recent reports of NCP cases, 
see OECD Watch, Home, http://www.oecdwatch.org/content.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).  A June, 
2005 challenge to a Brazilian hydroelectric dam, while possibly affecting local indigenous people, is based 
on challenges to the financial structure of the development.  See  OECD Watch, OEDC Watch Newsletter 7 
(Mar. 2006), http://www.oecdwatch.org/docs/OW_news_March_06_Eng.pdf; OECD Watch, News, 
http://www.oecdwatch.org/416.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2006). 
152
 Galit A. Sarfaty, The World Bank and the Internalization of Indigenous Rights Norms, 114 YALE 
L.J. 1791, 1793 (2005) (arguing that World Bank standards are “a minimum floor that any environmentally 
and socially sensitive project should meet.”) (citing Press Release, Friends of the Earth et al., Memorandum 
on Camisea Project Violations of World Bank Safeguard Policies (Oct. 17, 2002), http://www.bicusa.org/ 
bicusa/issues/ misc_resources/338.php). 
153
 See Nam Theun 2 Power, http://www.namtheun2.com/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2006); WORLD BANK, 
Proposed Nam Theun 2 Hydroelectric Project in Lao: PDR World Bank Responses to IRN-ED Technical 
Reviews (Mar. 21, 2005), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAOPRD/Resources/IRN-EDF-Review-
Response-March-21.pdf. 
154
 Id. 
155
 Id.  Development studies had already been released to the World Bank and to the public by 
November 23, 2004, when the NGOs sent their initial complaint.  See NT2 Complaint, supra note 97.  The 
additional agreement on social responsibility EDF signed is dated January 24, 2005.  See 
Recommendations, supra note 142.  Although it is impossible to know if the complaint alone initiated this 
additional commitment to social responsibility, a decision to do so at this time indicates sensitivity to the 
issues.   
156
 The former president of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn, acknowledged that challenges to the 
plans for Nam Theun II resulted in improved provisions for people in the region and more care taken to 
protect wildlife and biodiversity.  For audio of the interview, see NPR Interview, supra note 112.   
157
 Id.  
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the influence of NCP review is provided by EDF’s first-ever partnership 
with an NGO, CARE France,158 in 2005.159  According to EDF, this 
partnership will contribute to EDF’s sustainable development policy, 
particularly as it concerns the effect on populations local to the NT2 
project.160 
The NCP review process provided the indigenous people affected by 
NT2, as represented by NGOs, the ability to express their concerns in a 
meaningful way and compel the developer of the dam to respond.  It is 
unlikely these challenges would have been raised in the absence of the NCP 
review process, which provided the affected people with a forum for voicing 
their concerns. 
B. The Continued Peace of the People Affected by Nam Theun II 
Development Shows the Effectiveness of NCP Review as a Partial 
Solution to the Silence of Indigenous Peoples 
The Hmong, one of the indigenous peoples who will be displaced by 
NT2,161 have a long history of rebellion in Laos.162  During the French 
colonial period, French insensitivity to Hmong interests, “especially their 
failure to appreciate the devastating effect of tax increases on the already 
low Hmong standard of living, periodically incited large numbers of Laotian 
Hmong to armed rebellion.”163  Until the late 1940s, Hmong were treated as 
second-class citizens by the ethnic Lao, forced to literally grovel before Lao 
officials, charged higher prices, and paid lower wages than Lao people.164  
This led to a series of rebellions that were eventually subsumed in the 
Communist uprising.165 
Given this history, the involuntary resettlement necessary to build 
NT2 could be expected to face fierce local resistance.  Although involuntary 
resettlement of the Hmong has not begun in earnest,166 the current lack of 
                                           
158
 CARE works internationally with poor communities to supply a sustainable response to poverty.   
See, e.g., CARE, Home, http://www.care.org (last visited Apr. 14, 2006); Press Release, CARE, EDF 
Group Signs a Partnership with CARE France (May 2005), http://www.edf.com/55468d/Homecom/ 
Whoweare/Commitments/FichiersEN/PDFCAREEN [Hereinafter CARE Press Release]. 
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 See CARE Press Release, supra note 158. 
160
 See id. 
161
 See SEMFOP-1, supra note 115, at 6. 
162
 See KEITH QUINCY, HMONG: HISTORY OF A PEOPLE 115-116 (1988). 
163
 See id. at 116. 
164
 See id. at 140-141. 
165
 See id. at 140-156. 
166
 See Nam Theun 2 Power, supra note 153.  A later report indicates that the first group of villagers 
are to be relocated in the second half of 2006, with all resettlement completed by September of 2007.  See 
Nam Theun 2, Semi-Annual Progress Report: Period July to December 2005, Document No. NTPC 
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substantial disputes is promising.167  Preliminary construction began in 
2004,168 and the Nam Theun River was diverted in March 2006.169  Peaceful 
development in traditionally held Hmong lands indicates that something in 
this development process is being done right.  Admittedly, disputes could 
arise in the future, particularly as resettlement begins in earnest or if 
significant problems with compensation arise.  Significant steps, however, 
have been taken to preempt such problems.  
An indigenous group without peaceful, legal alternatives to change an 
impending situation may turn to what seems like the only option—protest.170  
Regardless of its initial form, protest holds an inherent risk of escalation to 
violence.171  In a regime where government protest is outlawed, even 
peaceful protest, in the form of rallies, sit-ins, or non-payment of taxes, may 
be perceived as a threat to the government and may not remain peaceful for 
long.172  For certain groups, like the Lao Hmong, with a long history of 
armed rebellion, protest may lead to violence.173  Even traditionally peaceful 
people, such as the Bougainville islanders of PNG, may resort to aggression 
when they feel they have no alternatives.174  
C. Reconsidering the Disaster of Bougainville and Envisioning the 
Future of the NCP Process 
Specific problems in the process of developing Bougainville’s 
Panguna mine, exacerbated by failed or non-existent environmental controls, 
led to environmental degradation, rebellion, and civil war.  During the 
development process, the indigenous people were treated as “ignorant 
savages, incapable of participating in a discussion to reach a consensus on a 
                                                                                                                              
B091802000001A, 37 (Jan. 15, 2005), http://www.namtheun2.com/gallery/lib_anreport/NTPC-%20-B09-
1802-000001-A.pdf  [hereinafter Progress Report]. 
167
 No protests or uprisings have been reported.  Four complaints have been made to the grievance 
offices organized to allow villagers affected by construction to express concerns and requests.  These 
complaints include damage to a fish pond and roofs, that have now been repaired, and revisions have been 
made to the procedures that caused the initial damage.  Another complaint arose over compensation issues 
during preliminary resettlement, but this has also been resolved.  A request made about road conditions is 
under consideration.  See Progress Report, supra note 166 at 45. 
168
 Id. at 2. 
169
 See Laos News Agency, Nam Theun River Successfully Diverted, VIENTAINE TIMES,  
Mar. 7, 2006 . 
170
 See generally CHOUDRY, supra note 3.  
171
 One of the earliest protests on Bougainville, in 1969, was the formation of a human chain across 
land to be surveyed and bulldozed for a port.  Rio Tinto responded to this peaceful protest with violence. 
See Havini, supra note 7, at  68-69. 
172
 See JONATHAN A. FOX & L. DAVID BROWN, THE STRUGGLE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY: THE WORLD 
BANK, NGOS, AND GRASSROOTS MOVEMENTS 16 (1998). 
173
 See QUINCY, supra note 162, at 115-116. 
174
 See Havini & Havini, supra note 7. 
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resolution which would be beneficial to all parties.”175  According to project 
plans, only a minimal amount of the profit from the mine was to be invested 
in Bougainville’s infrastructure development, despite the direct and 
substantial effects on local inhabitants.176 
Environmental devastation, land loss, and social unrest led to 
indigenous demands for environmental cleanup and local profit 
investment.177  Francis Ona, the leader of the Panguna Landowners 
Association,178 attempted to deal with the mine by demanding ten billion 
kina179 from Rio Tinto to compensate for environmental damage caused by 
development.180  Ona also demanded a fifty-percent share in the mine’s 
profits, consultation on all new projects, and localization of ownership 
within five years.181  When mine authorities refused to listen, Ona formed 
the BRA, and began a guerrilla assault on mine facilities and personnel.  
1. Rio Tinto and the PNG Government Failed to Protect the Environment 
or to Consult the Indigenous People Affected by the Mine, Leading to 
the Disaster for Bougainville  
Two primary causes of the Bougainville rebellion include the colonial 
government’s lack of consultation about the mine with the indigenous 
people, and the environmental damage the mine caused.182  The mining 
agreement created by the Australian government “left no room for 
discussion and consultation, and the PNG government likewise refused to 
engage in consultation and consensus building”183 with the native people. 
Although the concessions Ona demanded from Rio Tinto before 
beginning his guerrilla campaign to close the mine were deliberately 
exaggerated to ensure that they would be dismissed, thus justifying future 
violence,184 the essential elements of his demands were reasonable: money 
to fix environmental damage caused by the mine, local investment of mine 
profits, and localized ownership.  
                                           
175
 See HOWLEY, supra note 7, at 25. 
176
 Id. at 26. 
177
 Id. at 36. 
178
 The Panguna Landowners Association was an association of native landholders allied with the 
Bougainville government and founded to raise issues related to mine finance and pollution.  It later 
developed into a insurrectionary organization with a policy of arson and violence toward mining personnel.  
Id. at 28. 
179
 This is approximately equivalent to U.S.$10 billion.  Alley, supra note 7, at 230. 
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 See id.; see also HOWLEY, supra note 7, at 36. 
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 Alley, supra note 7, at 230. 
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 HOWLEY, supra note 7, at 28. 
183
 Id. at 1.  
184
 Alley, supra note 7, at 230. 
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2. The NCP Review Process Would Have Provided a Way for the 
Indigenous People to Have Their Complaints Heard, Ideally Before 
Development Began 
Using the NCP review process would have allowed the indigenous 
people of Bougainville to bring a specific instance before the National 
Contact Point of either Australia or the United Kingdom.185  Rio Tinto is a 
corporation based in Australia and the United Kingdom,186 both OCED 
members.187  NCP review would have given the indigenous people of 
Bougainville a way to have their concerns heard by a disinterested third 
party, either before development began, or at any point during construction 
or operation.  
The primary information necessary to challenge project adequacy is 
the information provided by the developer for investors, or provided to 
comply with public disclosure requirements.  Not only does this provide 
information for review, it also ensures that the developer has a complete 
mitigation plan prior to the start of development.  The affected indigenous 
people allege Rio Tinto took no environmental precautions in building or 
running the Panguna mine and made no environmental or cultural 
assessments before construction began, despite promising to protect the 
environment.188  Mitigation information available during Panguna 
development may not compare to the exhaustive documentation for NT2, but 
the Guidelines provide that Multinationals should “ensure that timely, 
regular, reliable, and relevant information is disclosed regarding their 
activities, structure, financial situation, and performance.”189  Reporting 
                                           
185
 The current NCP review process only became available in 2000, long after the Panguna mine was 
constructed and its unfortunate consequences felt.  This analysis is only meant to illustrate the effectiveness 
of the NCP review process, and is not a criticism of the people of Bougainville. 
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 The Rio Tinto Group (Rio Tinto) is composed of Rio Tinto PLC, a British and Wales corporation, 
and Rio Tinto Limited, an Australian corporation.  The Rio Tinto Group owns and operates subsidiaries 
worldwide as holding companies.  The present day Rio Tinto emerged from the 1995 union of RTZ 
Corporation plc and Conzinc Riotinto of Australia into RTZ/CRA, which later changed its name to Rio 
Tinto.  Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL) is a PNG corporation, 53.6% owned by Rio Tinto in 2000.  
The Panguna mine was developed by Conzinc Rio Tinto, and at the time of mine construction and 
management, Rio Tinto held a higher percentage of stock and exercised complete control of BCL, with 
London executives controlling all major mine decisions.  See Rio Tinto Complaint, supra note 7, at 8-10;  
Rio Tinto, About the Company: History, http://www.riotinto.com/aboutus/history.aspx (last visited Apr. 14, 
2006).   
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 See OECD Home, supra note 35. 
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 See Rio Tinto Complaint, supra note 7, at 2-3.  Plaintiffs also allege that Rio Tinto has a “long 
history of wanton disregard for the environment and local populations,” including violations of 
environmental regulations in Australia, the United Kingdom, India, Namibia, and South Africa.  Rio Tinto 
also has been the subject of United Nations resolutions, a UN sponsored court case, and numerous 
demonstrations in Western Europe.  Id. at 27-31.  
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 GUIDELINES, supra note 32, pt. 1.III.1. 
SEPTEMBER 2006 OECD GUIDELINES 729 
  
should include environmental and social reporting190 and systems of 
managing risk.191  This information would have provided the people of 
Bougainville information on which to base their complaint.  
The OECD Guidelines contain numerous provisions under which the 
indigenous people could have raised challenges, many falling within the 
chapter on environment.192  One specific problem that could have been 
addressed by NCP review is inadequate compensation for land seizures. 
Native and Australian colonial concepts of property at the time of the mine 
land grants were vastly different.193  Under the Australian standard applied, 
all land below the surface belonged to the State, a concept of land rights that 
greatly benefited the colonial administration.194  Traditional indigenous 
conceptions of land were all-encompassing.195  In the words of the 
indigenous people, land is:  
our physical life; it is marriage; it is status; it is security; it is 
politics; in fact, it is our only world … We have little or no 
experience of social survival detached from the land.  For us to 
be completely landless is a nightmare for which no dollar in the 
pocket or dollar in the bank will allay.196  
This statement indicates that cash compensation for land, no matter how 
financially generous, would be inadequate mitigation for tearing up the 
structure of social life.  OECD Guidelines Part 1.II states that “[e]nterprises 
should take fully into account established policies in the countries in which 
they operate, and consider the views of other stakeholders.” 197  Although the 
use of “should” eliminates any force from this provision, it does lay out an 
obligation to consider established policies, and to consider stakeholder 
views, a category the landless villagers fall into.  
                                           
190
 Id. pt. 1.III.2. 
191
 Id. pt. 1.III.5.b.  
192
 Id. pt. 1.V.  
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 See HOWLEY, supra note 7, at 25; Alley, supra note 7, at 227. 
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 Granting underground land rights to Rio Tinto led to the government partnership and profit 
sharing.  See HOWLEY, supra note 7, at 25. 
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 See Alley, supra note 7, at 227. 
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 Stakeholders, under the Guidelines, include the local community, business interests, employees, 
customers, suppliers, contractors, and the public-at-large.  See GUIDELINES, supra note 32, pts. 3.3, 3.35.  
Stakeholders may also include creditors, investors, and the representative bodies of employees.  See OECD 
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Principle IV, Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (OECD) Doc. SG/CG(99)5 (2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/ 
31557724.pdf.  More generally, stakeholders are people who affect and are affected by the performance of 
a company.  See Petros Vellas, International Project Finance: Social Accountability of Project Companies 
as a Credit-Risk Mitigation Tool for Lenders, 16 I.C.C.L.R. 178, n.1 (2005). 
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This loose language allows the “established policies” of the 
indigenous people to be considered equally with the “established policies” of 
the Australian government.  Although Australia’s policy at the time of the 
Bougainville disaster did not allow indigenous control over underlying land, 
the indigenous people themselves have established policies, or customs, that 
made land ownership the fundamental basis for social interaction.  Because 
neither the Australian nor the indigenous practice is necessarily more valid 
under the Guidelines, indigenous customs could be considered equally in the 
course of land seizure.  Mitigation measures, in order to be adequate, could 
consider the value of land that extends beyond money, perhaps by providing 
alternative acceptable land rather than cash. 
The notion that native custom should be considered equally with 
colonial practice is supported by the PNG Constitution.  At the time of PNG 
independence, the PNG constitution adopted custom as part of the 
underlying law, along with the principles and rules of common law and 
equity.198  Embracing custom rather than looking merely to colonial legal 
traditions acknowledges the continuing value of local tradition in 
establishing national law.199  Although this Constitution did not yet exist 
when construction began on the Panguna mine, its adoption corroborates the 
idea that indigenous custom should be evaluated on equal terms with 
colonial rule when an enterprise “take[s] fully into account established 
policies in the countries in which [it] operate[s], and consider[s] the views of 
other stakeholders.”200  
“Consider” is another weakly worded requirement.  The provision, 
however, is enough to provide a basis for NCP review.  This opens the door 
to third-party evaluation of the project and its effects, and may even lead to 
discussion and settlement between the parties, a far better outcome than 
violence, civil war, and destruction. 
Because the NCP has no enforcement power, it has no power to police 
actors.201  Given its limitations, what makes NCP review most effective is 
that it provides a way to prevent development until adequate mitigation 
measures exist.  NCP review could have recognized and taken into account 
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 See PAPUA N.G. CONST. scheds. 2.1, 2.2; Alyssa A. Vegter, Comment, Forsaking the Forests for 
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of customary ownership or property laws that have developed in various regions, as seen in local land 
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indigenous customs in Bougainville.  Rather than being treated as ignorant 
savages, incapable of discussion, the indigenous people could have been 
treated with respect, and their concerns heard.  Simply being allowed to 
participate could have done a great deal to prevent the rebellion and civil 
war.  
Furthermore, participation in the process would likely have some 
influence on Rio Tinto.  Rio Tinto might not have treated the indigenous 
people as “ignorant savages” once they were known to be capable of 
participating in a complex international dispute resolution process.  NCP 
review would also have provided incentive for restraint by bringing Rio 
Tinto’s actions to public attention.  
NCP review is not perfect.  Even if specific instances were raised 
against Rio Tinto, government actions would escape review.202  The 
government could not have been forced to use any of the profits for 
developing infrastructure on Bougainville, nor would it have prevented the 
government from calling in the army to protect the mine or restore peace.  
Arguably, however, and according to allegations, both the Australian and the 
PNG governments were lured into agreements and actions that hurt 
Bougainville’s indigenous people because of pressure from Rio Tinto, 
primarily through fear of financial consequences.203  Without the pressure 
exerted by Rio Tinto, the governments would not have acted as they did.  If 
Bougainville’s indigenous people had been able to obtain NCP review before 
development of the mine began, that pressure might not have been placed on 
the governments.  
By providing a forum for review in which indigenous people could 
have expressed their concerns about development, the disastrous 
consequences of the Panguna development could have been avoided.  
Development can be designed to minimize the negative effects on people 
and land; NCP review provides a way for affected indigenous people to 
influence that design.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The process provided by NCP review can and should be used to the 
benefit of indigenous people in the development context.  Several attributes 
                                           
202
 NCP review does not extend to the actions of sovereign states, although it does cover state-owned 
multinationals.  Id. pt. 1.I.3.  
203
 See Rio Tinto Complaint, supra note 7, at 1, 23, 26, 43.  One specific alleged instance of financial 
intimidation by Rio Tinto was when Rio Tinto threatened to pull out of the Panguna mine along with all 
other planned investment in PNG unless the government managed to reopen the Panguna mine through the 
use of military force.  Id. at 43.  
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of the NCP review process make it ideal for indigenous people.  The process 
allows third-party disinterested review of development projects before 
development actually begins and cannot be undone.  The process requires a 
response from the Multinational involved in the process, while indigenous 
concerns expressed without the process could simply be ignored by the 
Multinational.  As soft law, the Guidelines retain the flexibility to address 
problems across borders and between disparate groups.  
NCP review helps prevent problems caused by the international nature 
of Multinationals.  An affected group is not limited to the courts of its own 
country, or to international fora.  A group can circumvent inadequate or 
unfair processes in its own country and use NCP review in Multinational’s 
home country.  There, too, the Multinational has less chance of avoiding 
challenges brought against it.  
As shown in the NT2 development in Laos and in the reconsideration 
of the Bougainville disaster in Papua New Guinea, NCP review can be 
applied to development disputes throughout the Pacific Rim.  Review is not 
limited to indigenous peoples; it can be used to create an additional level of 
review by any group affected by development.  Two sides exist in every 
development project, and there is often an imbalance of power between 
them.  NCP review can help level the playing field, regardless of the 
resources of the players.  
NCP review cannot solve all the problems inherent in international 
development.  It can, however, provide an opportunity for indigenous 
peoples affected by development to express their concerns about 
development and mitigation, to receive a response to those concerns, and to 
receive an impartial evaluation of future plans.  When a developer originates 
from an adhering country, indigenous peoples should use this tool to 
improve plans, mitigation, and project review. 
